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BOOK REVIEWS

HOW SENIOR LEADERS VIEW THE WORLD
Saunders, Elizabeth N. Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell Univ. Press, 2011. 320pp. $35

In today’s political environment, military intervention is frequently debated.
These discussions often bring to light
interesting points of agreement and perhaps surprising instances of disagreement. In the end, it is with the president
that the final decision rests. Elizabeth
Saunders explores the rationales that
U.S. presidents have used for deciding whether or not to initiate military
interventions. Dr. Saunders, a graduate
of Yale, now teaching at George Washington University, advances a thesis
that the model of intervention depends
mainly on a president’s formative ways
of thinking about foreign policy. While
it may seem that these views would follow party lines, Saunders shows that this
is not necessarily true. On one hand, the
internal approach focuses on how the
foreign state is organized and follows
the transformative model. In contrast,
the external approach looks at states’
outward behavior and uses a surgical
strike–type model to coerce change in
behavior. The author chose to examine
Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy,
and Lyndon B. Johnson for two important reasons. First, among the three a
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consensus would be expected based on
the prevalent Cold War mentality and
context. In fact, these three did not follow in lockstep. The shared case of Vietnam, the second reason for the author’s
selections, highlights their differences.
Eisenhower was an externally focused
president; if states’ external policies were
successful, he chose largely to ignore
internal issues in those same states.
A decreased priority on conventional
forces translated under Eisenhower
to less investment in transformative
capabilities. Lebanon was his only
overt intervention; Eisenhower did not
intervene in Vietnam in 1954 or in Iraq
in 1958. In contrast, Kennedy sought to
influence states’ domestic institutions.
His predetermined agenda, based on his
congressional career, explains his choice
and method of intervention in Vietnam.
This theme held true with the murder of
Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, which preceded Kennedy’s own assassination by only
a few weeks. Johnson, despite his obvious ties to Kennedy, was an externally
focused president as regarded foreign
affairs. Saunders highlights that while
this diverges from his transformative

1

154

Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 3, Art. 11

N AVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

domestic agenda, it explains Johnson’s
expansion of the Vietnam War in such
a different direction from Kennedy.
The well-researched text concludes
by looking beyond Vietnam at how
well the pattern holds under different circumstances and time periods,
to include the Iraq war. Saunders’s
framework categorizes presidents as
belonging to either of two ideal types.
While this may hold from a strictly
political science view, it falls short of
the reality of history. For this reason,
the book will appeal more to political scientists or those seeking modelcentric explanations of events. This
work should also have strong appeal
for strategists and people serving on
planning or policy staffs. Understanding how senior leaders view the world
is often as significant as factual knowledge of a given situation when providing recommended courses of action.
LT. COL. FREDERICK H. BLACK, JR., U.S. ARMY

Naval War College

Marrin, Stephen. Improving Intelligence Analysis:
Bridging the Gap between Scholarship and Practice. New York: Routledge, 2011. 192pp. $130

A former CIA analyst turned scholar,
Stephen Marrin attempts to bridge the
gap between intelligence studies as an
academic discipline and intelligence as
a bureaucratic function. His analysis
grounded in the intelligence literature, Marrin provides readers a good
overview of such intelligence-studies
classics as those of Sherman Kent,
Roger Hilsman, and Richards Heuer,
along with more contemporary work
by Roger George, James Bruce, Richard
Betts, and Amy Zegart. Marrin certainly
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displays a penchant for the academic
that is informed by his former role
as an intelligence analyst. He believes
“intelligence scholarship can provide
knowledge and insight useful for the
analytic practitioner; so useful in fact,
that it will help improve the quality of
the resulting intelligence analysis.”
With such a goal, Marrin offers six
ways to improve intelligence analysis,
but it is unclear how he derives these.
Marrin does not draw his conclusions
from known cases of highly publicized
intelligence assessments. In the case
of Iraq, it would have been useful to
illustrate why the State Department’s
Bureau of Intelligence and Research had
a better answer on the status of Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction program
than the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Had Marrin tested his advice against
known intelligence failures or drawn
from assessments of failed analysis, his
advice would be more convincing.
With intelligence increasingly public
and used to justify or explain foreignpolicy decisions, it seems one more
piece of advice Marrin could offer
is how to incorporate public discussions or open sources into analysis.
Fortunately or not, the intelligence
community does not have a monopoly on the “facts,” so discussing
the ways in which analysts can more
readily connect with scholars and
the private sector would be useful.
To be fair, the book is focused on
intelligence analysis, but it seems to
ignore how, why, and where facts are
collected. In an era when both scholars and private citizens have access
to information, it is important that
Marrin address the epistemological
underpinnings of what is being analyzed. There is a logical and important
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relationship between collection and
analysis that is in need of further study.
In spite of the book’s shortcomings,
Marrin offers readers a look at what
a junior CIA analyst does and offers
a sketch of how to move beyond the
“generalized intuition” that often afflicts
intelligence analysis. His discussion of
improving intelligence analysis through
empathy is interesting and has implications for personnel recruiting. In fact,
this slim volume should be valued by
human-resources departments and
senior managers as they prepare for the
next reorganizations of their agencies.
DEREK REVERON

Naval War College

Rickards, James. Currency Wars: The Making of
the Next Global Crisis. New York: Penguin Group,
2011. 304pp. $26.95

Is the United States now engaged in a
currency war? Are we involved in an
international competition of currency
devaluation that will impact America
in seldom-studied ways that are critical
to its defense? James Rickards suggests
that we are, and that today’s currency war could be as devastating to
national security as any kinetic war.
James Rickards is a counselor, investment banker, and risk manager with
over thirty years of experience in
capital markets. He advises the Department of Defense, the intelligence
community, and major hedge funds
on global finance. He served as a facilitator for the first-ever financial war
games conducted by the Pentagon.
Rickards argues that currency conflicts should and must interest our
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military leaders. Such conflicts can
and should be prepared for, because
the cheap-dollar policies of both the
present and immediate past administrations portend a dollar crisis. Rickards
argues that policy makers have lost the
enormous national-security advantages that dollar hegemony affords,
by adopting weak-dollar policies.
In part 1 Rickards discusses Pentagonsponsored “war” gaming in 2009, using
rules of engagement (ROE) in which the
only “weapons” allowed were currencies,
stocks, bonds, and derivatives. Because
the specific ROE were unrealistic,
however, the results were inconclusive,
although useful for future simulations.
Then, in part 2, the author delves into
historical accounts of what he calls
“Currency War I” (1921–36) and
“Currency War II” (1967–87). Rickards
argues that we have now entered
“Currency War III,” the three primary
combatants being the United States,
China, and Europe. He argues that there
are four possible outcomes of Currency
War III: a move to multiple reserve currencies, with the dollar playing a much
smaller role; an International Monetary
Fund–controlled world money, called
“Special Drawing Rights”; a return to
the gold standard, at a substantially
higher gold price (the prospect endorsed by Rickards); and chaos. This last
possibility and the associated dollar collapse appears most likely to the author.
It is unfortunate that Rickards did not
include any reference to Edward S.
Miller’s Bankrupting the Enemy: The
U.S. Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl
Harbor (Naval Institute Press, 2007),
written by a skilled financial analyst
who discusses in great detail how the
Franklin D. Roosevelt administration
used dollar hegemony to block Japan
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from world financial markets. One
could argue that Currency War I culminated on 25 July 1941 with Executive
Order 8832, which froze Japanese financial assets. Dollar hegemony was an
essential national-security tool used to
deprive Japan of the resources needed to
wage war. Miller’s work is a useful illustration of the utility of a strong dollar.
In summary, Rickards provides an
excellent account of the currency
wars. He provides information that
should be at the fingertips of every national security planner.
EDWARD FULLER, Incline Village, Nevada, and
ROBERT C. WHITTEN, Cupertino, California

Leffler, Melvyn P., and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds. In
Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the
Berlin Wall and 9/11. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ.
Press, 2011. 243pp. $19.95

This collection of ten essays focuses
on the American government’s foreign
policy through three administrations
after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9
November 1989, and also after the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Editors Melvyn Leffler and Jeffrey Legro
examine these events from the perspectives of both the policy makers who
were active in Presidents George H. W.
Bush’s, Bill Clinton’s, and George W.
Bush’s administrations and scholars
who have analyzed the government’s
actions. Government response to these
events provides strong examples of
how the United States reacts in times
of uncertainty. The editors chose the
Berlin Wall and 9/11 because both
events impacted the global order to an
extent requiring a complete reexamination of the nation’s foreign policy.
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The chapters written by scholars
provide excellent background, discussing the situations before, during, and
after the events. However, the chapters
written by government officials involved
in policy decisions greatly enhance and
increase the success of this work. The
collaborators from these administrations have yet to publish their individual
memoirs, making their perspectives
not only unique but refreshing.
In his essay, “Shaping the Future: Planning at the Pentagon, 1989–1993,” Paul
Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy during George H. W. Bush’s
administration and U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense during George W. Bush’s
administration, discusses how defense
decisions made at the end of the Cold
War influenced decisions after 9/11. His
analysis of the similarities between strategic decisions made in 1989 and 2001,
as well as of the impact that the 1989
decisions had on 2001 strategy plans,
is one of the most interesting parts
of this book. Eric Edelman also does
this especially well in his “The Strange
Career of the 1992 Defense Planning
Guidance,” in which he compares the
1992 Defense Planning Guidance to
2002’s National Security Strategy. He
served George W. Bush as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as well as
Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice
President for National Security Affairs.
John Mueller, who holds the Woody
Hayes Chair of National Security
Studies at the Mershon Center, takes
an approach different from those of
his fellow collaborators in “Questing for Monsters to Destroy.” He adds
2 September 1945, the end of World
War II, and the Korean invasion by the
North Koreans on 25 June 1950 as
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equally important events for American
foreign policy in times of uncertainty.
One of the major considerations for
both policy makers and scholars is the
impact these events had on the military.
Whether to increase or decrease the active forces was a complicated issue that
caused disagreement among government officials in both 1989 and 2001.
Readers of this journal will find particularly interesting the varying opinions
regarding the military, especially in light
of currently anticipated force restructurings and budgetary constraints.
While each chapter can be read on its
own, an author sometimes refers to
another chapter, establishing a continuity that may be lost or underappreciated
otherwise. This is especially true for essays written by policy makers. The editors are to be congratulated on a timely
and helpful volume that not only studies American foreign policy in the recent
times of uncertainty but provides food
for thought for the uncertainty of now.
NORAH SCHNEIDER

Salve Regina University

Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, eds. Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat. 2nd
ed. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
2010. 360pp. $30

In some ways, publishing a book that
purports to capture contemporary
African political trends, particularly
involving the “progress of democracy,”
faces the same basic problem as do
books attempting to explain state-ofthe-art computers. Both information
streams are now flowing so quickly that
the truth you write about today may be
very different from that of tomorrow. In
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fact, the African scholar has even harder
going than his information-systems
contemporary, because unlike computer
technology, the course of democracy in
Africa frequently changes direction and
from time to time even reverses itself.
The editors of Democratization in Africa:
Progress and Retreat are, as the title indicates, well aware of this challenge. This
is not surprising. This volume is part
of the International Forum for Democratic Studies’ Journal of Democracy
book series, and both Diamond and
Plattner have edited numerous volumes.
The book is well written, well researched, and well organized. The
reader is first treated to a selection of
seven readings, all looking at themes
involving “progress and retreat.” The
remainder of the book is divided into
three sections, covering West Africa,
East Africa, and southern and central
Africa. Given the events in North Africa,
the lack of coverage along Africa’s
Mediterranean shore is regrettable and
underscores the point about “lag time.”
In general, the first section of the book
is thought provoking and arguably
the most useful. The topics are broad,
and their panoramic view allows the
authors to chart the many directions
of emerging trends. For example, John
Clark of Florida International University argues that the military coup as
an instrument of regime change is in
decline. While certain events indicate
that the end of the African military
coup is nowhere near in sight, in the
main it seems that Clark is correct.
Despite the editors’ best efforts, shelf life
remains a problem. Although updated
for this new edition with new information, many of the book’s chapters were
written far enough in the past that the
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situation itself is out-of-date. Despite
the book’s 2010 publication date,
twenty-one of the twenty-four essays
here were originally published between
2007 and 2009. Not all these essays are
“expired,” Clark’s being a case in point.
However, the careful reader is forced to
spend far too much time checking other
sources to learn the actual current “state
of play.” In some cases, however, such
as Côte d’Ivoire, the changes from the
time of initial publication to the present
is extreme. In others, such as Zimbabwe, current events have not called
the author’s findings into question.
In the end, despite powerful writing,
careful scholarship, and the best of
intentions, Democratization in Africa is too much of a “fly in amber.”
Teachers, students, and lay readers
alike would be better advised simply
to subscribe to the Journal of Democracy. For a slightly higher cost they
would reap much greater gain.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

Cohen, Eliot A. Conquered into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles along the Great Warpath That
Made the American Way of War. New York: Free
Press, 2011. 405pp. $30

The American way of war—a product of two centuries of war with . . .
Canada? How can that be? Civil War
history and the experience and history of World War II have driven out
of our minds a truth known to James
Fenimore Cooper, Francis Parkman,
and Kenneth Roberts. The American
colonies, thereafter the United States,
fought battle after battle with France,
Britain, and Canada throughout most
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of the seventeenth century and until the early nineteenth century. The
place of these battles was then called
the Great Warpath, stretching from
Albany to Montreal and Quebec.
American readers who pick up Eliot
Cohen’s Conquered into Liberty will
most likely be embarrassed by learning
how much they do not know (or only
vaguely remember) about American
war fighting in the colonial and early
national periods. However, by the time
the first chapter, about the Schenectady
raid of 1690, is finished, American readers will feel embraced, as though part of
their American selves has been returned.
Non-Americans will be surprised at first,
and by the end of the book astonished.
Cohen teaches strategic studies at the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, and he was a
senior adviser to the secretary of state
on strategic issues from 2007 to 2009.
This book is a military history, as good
a one as might ever be done. As a historian, Cohen’s strongest suit is that he
treats war as it is made by political and
military leaders, by the regulars (and irregulars and Native Americans), and by
“leaders and managers who got things
done.” By the last he means those (mostly citizen-soldiers) who improvised in
combat and managed to supply forces
under nearly impossible conditions. His
insights regarding these sorts of men
make up a large part of his understanding of what the “American way of war”
is about. Cohen quotes Germany’s
Field Marshall Erwin Rommel to affirm
that what was an eighteenth-century
American quality has endured—the
American speed of adaptation to
armored warfare, Rommel wrote, is
explained “by their extraordinary sense
for the practical and the material and
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by their complete lack of regard for
tradition and worthless theories.”
American wars along the Great Warpath, Cohen reminds us, were parts
of European wars. The Atlantic Ocean
more linked us to Europe than it
insulated us from it. Moreover, these
wars exposed us to a full range of
seventeenth-to-nineteenth-century
European warfare, from set-piece
battles to what could be called unconventional and secret warfare. They
also brought the full horror of war to
us. Cohen explodes the contemporary
European notion that the United States
did not become “the territory of war”
or exposed to terror until 2001. Indeed,
terror in the form of murderous raids
on New York and New England villages
marked much of its colonial period.
Among many other things, Cohen argues
that the American appetite for the kind
of unconditional surrender pursued by
Franklin Roosevelt in World War II had
its grounding in the eighteenth-century
American intention to destroy the enemy polity that was Canada. More than
that, America’s wars to attach Canada
to itself were wars for the freedom of
that polity. Cohen says, “If any countries
have ever been ‘conquered into liberty,’
as the Continental Congress had written
to the doubtful habitants of Canada
in 1775, they were Germany, Italy, and
Japan, occupied and transformed by
armies that combined, in paradoxical
degree, thoroughness in defeating an
enemy and an unlimited, even naïve,
commitment to liberating him.”
Cohen’s book is an astonishingly
good read in addition to being highly
thoughtful and often revelatory.
KEN JENSEN

McLean, Virginia
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Matzke, Rebecca Berens. Deterrence through
Strength: British Naval Power and Foreign Policy
under Pax Britannica. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska
Press, 2011. 320pp. $45

Historians have long argued about the
true mechanism behind a ninety-year
period of relative peace in Europe, a
period that began with the end of the
Napoleonic wars and became known
as the Pax Britannica. Over the years
critics have questioned both aspects
of this term—whether the period was
actually as peaceful as its title suggests
and whether that peace really was,
in large part, due to Great Britain’s
overwhelming and imposing commercial, industrial, financial, and naval
might. Through a searching analysis of
political decision making during three
different crises within an eight-year
period, Rebecca Matzke’s book, itself a
developed and published version of the
author’s Cornell University dissertation,
seeks to add weight to the notion that
Britain did indeed use the strength and
versatility of the Royal Navy as an effective deterrent force during this time.
The author explains that on three separate occasions between 1838 and 1846
(Canadian trade and border disputes
with the United States, 1838–42; the
Syrian crisis, 1840–41; and the first
Opium War of 1839–42), British politicians, in particular Lord Palmerston,
were not afraid to threaten the use of, or
to use, naval power to further discrete
British interests on the world stage and
to coerce and influence the activities
of their main rivals in Europe. In each
case, while the immediate aim was
obviously to benefit British regional
activities, each was undertaken with
an eye to preserving the broader peace
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and stability of the international order
as a whole. In other words, Britain’s
defensive “status quo” policy was
implemented by operationally offensive
threats or means. Furthermore, Matzke
clearly shows that the British politicians
well understood that if they failed to
respond to some of these lesser challenges (the Chinese opium war being a
prime example), over time they risked
weakening their ability to influence their
major adversaries in the future, in situations where the stakes might be higher.
During the course of her analysis,
Matzke takes issue with established
scholarship holding that the relative
inactivity of the Royal Navy during this
period was indicative of its comparative weakness within Europe as a whole.
On the contrary, she depicts an early
Victorian navy that was well up to the
task, possessing shipbuilding, logistics, and manpower support superior
to that of any competitor. It was this
depth of capability that represented
its major coercive value, particularly
to the European rivals, often allowing what she terms demonstrations of
Thomas Schelling’s “skillful nonuse of
military force.” Moreover, the British
instinctively knew all this, giving them
great confidence in their brinkmanship
with rivals. The case of the successful
coercion of France in the Egyptian/
Syrian crisis is a notable example.
Matzke’s work is meticulously researched, using a wide array of contemporary archival material that focuses
on the collected thoughts and writings
of the main players involved, material taken from their personal papers,
letters, and diaries. The weakness in
her work lies in the admittedly implicit
assumption that this short period can
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be taken as truly illustrative of the
situation throughout the whole of
the Pax Britannica. Arguably, Matzke
has found a narrow historical period
where thesis and facts align, but she is
less convincing over the broader time
frame, and more work would likely be
necessary to settle this point decisively.
Less important, but nonetheless still
of concern, is her rather rosy picture
of the reliability of the steamships of
the day. As John Beeler has forcefully
demonstrated, truly globally deployable, oceangoing steamers would have to
wait until the late 1880s to be realized;
their limitations until then, in terms of
maintenance requirements and support
while deployed, facts of which navies
were only too well aware, do not come
across well. That said, this is an important work that successfully advances
the study of British naval policy into
an earlier period. When taken together
with the more established scholarship
of the late Victorian and Edwardian
periods, it moves us closer to a more
complete understanding of British
efforts to wield naval power in support of a global free-trading system.
As such, it has timeless relevance.
ANGUS K. ROSS

Naval War College

Kleinen, John, and Manon Osseweijer, eds. Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives. Singapore and Leiden: ISEAS Press and International Institute for
Asian Studies, 2010. 312pp. $74
Liss, Carolin. Oceans of Crime: Maritime Piracy
and Transnational Security in Southeast Asia and
Bangladesh. Singapore and Leiden: ISEAS Press
and International Institute for Asian Studies,
2011. 446pp. $82.35
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These two books from the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies Press share
one single characteristic—a long delay
between authorship and publication. This has no appreciable effect
on Kleinen and Osseweijer’s edited
collection, based on a 2005 conference, but it ill serves Carolin Liss.
She evidently completed her book
in 2006. Since then, however, various maritime-security initiatives in
the region whose births she observed,
including the various Malacca Strait
patrols and the ReCAAP information
exchange, have matured. It would have
been interesting to have her views on
the decline in major incidents that
gathered pace starting in 2005—as to
the degree to which they contributed
to this decline, and what caused the
recent modest uptick in numbers.
This is a disappointing shortcoming, because her survey up to 2006 adds much
useful detail to what are now a number
of well-established themes. Her contributions are particularly welcome in two
areas, first on small-scale piracy. There
she advances a persuasive argument that
the general and substantial increase in
fishing-boat numbers and the use of
more sophisticated search equipment
beginning in the 1950s (which resulted
in widespread overfishing) and, within
that overall picture, the malign effects
of large and sophisticated foreign ships
operating illegally contributed, possibly significantly, to the rise of piracy
everywhere from the Philippines to
Bangladesh. Also welcome is her critical
examination of the political, practical,
and moral effects of substituting private
security companies for governmentprovided security. Among several observations none is more germane than that
private security would be unnecessary
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if governments had more interest in
protecting maritime trade and made
a better job of it when they try. This
point has relevance to the waters off
Somalia as well. If Liss misses anything,
it is that governments prior to the
modern naval era expected individual
ships to look after themselves and that
the return of piracy at the end of the
twentieth century is producing an edging back toward a similar expectation.
Kleinen and Osseweijer’s book is the
fourth in a series from ISEAS that has
focused primarily on modern piracy
in Southeast Asia. In contrast to its
predecessors, half the book is devoted
to historical cases. It contains a number of noteworthy contributions to the
literature on piracy studies, ranging
from an excellent chapter by one of the
editors, John Kleinen (on the inapplicability of Eric Hobsbawn’s radical and
romantic thesis that bandits could be
Robin Hoods), to the historical experience of piracy in Asia. Robert Antony’s
detailed study of the frontier town of
Giang Binh adds to our knowledge
of the late-eighteenth-century southern Chinese “water world,” which
was first explored by Dian Murray.
The majority of the essays, however,
concentrate on waters between the
southern Philippines and Borneo,
centered on the Sulu Archipelago. James
Warren adds to his indispensable work
on the Sulu Zone with a chapter on
the workings of the Sulu slave market
between 1800 and 1850. Esther Velthoen
examines Dutch attempts to tame
coastal raiding up until 1905, efforts
that have some remarkable similarities
to Roman attempts to curb Cilician
piracy. Stefan Amirell describes the
region between 1959 and 1963, when
Britain was left as the sole colonial
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power, struggling to contain an upsurge
of piracy following the withdrawal of
the Americans from the Philippines
and the Dutch from Indonesia. Two
complementary studies of the contemporary situation, one by Carolin
Liss, from the perspective of Sabah,
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and the second by Ikuya Tokoro, from
the perspective of Sulu, complete this
examination of a region where piracy
was, and to an extent remains, a way
of life for marginalized communities.
MARTIN N. MURPHY

Washington, D.C.
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